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INDIGENOUS SELF-DETERMINATION IN LATIN AMERICA
Angel R. Oquendo*
The indigenous people of the Americas (or what is traditionally known
as Latin America) have been fighting for their rights for centuries. They
have struggled not only to secure, but also to define what they are entitled
to. In this effort, they have faced a society that has consistently violated,
but ambivalently conceived of their prerogatives. Throughout Iberian
American history, governments have radically changed their understanding
of the rights that they have encroached.
During the colonial period, Indiano law often strove to protect
autochthonous communities and to defend them from exploitation. It took
pains to preserve their customs, traditions, and social structures, provided
they accepted the empire's sovereignty claim and embraced its religion.
Obviously, this well-intentioned effort was unsuccessful. The imperial
emissaries inexorably devastated tribes, as well as entire civilizations.
With this experience, the Latin American gap between legal norm and
reality was born.
Without a doubt, the lack of enforcement was not accidental. The
colonization project was an enterprise of domination and annihilation. The
Indiano legislative superstructure could not alter this fact. Bans and
proclamations could hardly transform avid conquerors into apostles of
racial tolerance.
Independence brought a new rhetoric to indigenous affairs. The
constitutions and the codes of this period celebrated the liberal spirit that
had inspired the secessionist insurrection. They granted constituents from
primordial communities political and civil rights equivalent to those of
other citizens. Evoking French revolutionary ideology, the constitutions
informed these people that the republican family would welcome them as
individuals, but not as members of their respective groups.
Once again, deeds lagged far behind words. Indigenous citizens never
fully enjoyed the freedoms they were promised. The authorities invariably
disregarded both the letter and the spirit of the law. They ignored outright
the legal demands or imposed innumerable prerequisites on the acquisition
of the new civic entitlements, such as the attainment of a certain level of
education or wealth. The state thus ended up excluding many members of
the native communities. The situation remained basically unchanged upon
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the incorporation of social and economic rights throughout the twentieth
century.
Moreover, the specific pattern of objective reality tearing asunder the
legal Procrustean bed repeated itself. To a certain extent, the process of
forced assimilation under the guise of nineteenth century egalitarianism
operated as a second conquest. The consolidation and expansion of Iberian
American nations entailed a logic of its own that defied the legally
established ideological parameters.
Recently, there has been a clamor in Latin America to end this
formalistic approach to indigenous rights. In part, this demand has
emerged internally, as a result of the intense political and military
mobilization of the native peoples in countries such as Mexico, Ecuador,
and Bolivia. International forces, such as the emergence of a third
generation of collective rights for minorities and aboriginal groups in the
context of the human rights revolution, have also played a role in this
development.
This historical juncture presents two fundamental challenges. First,
Latin America must avoid regressing to the colonial model under which
the autochthonous communities theoretically preserved their way of life,
but were deprived of the benefits enjoyed by the rest of society. Latin
America must instead find formulas that respect these communities' rights
to both equality and difference. Second, the disparity between written law
and legal practice has to end, or at least diminish substantially. The
ordinances, regulations, statutes, constitutions, and conventions that call
for reform should not rest at idle posturing.
The essays "Ethnicity and Nationhood in the Struggle for Recognition:
The Mapuches in Chilean Society," by Jorge Ivdn Vergara and Rolf
Foerster, and "Ethnicity and Citizenship in Recent Andean History (1930 1990)," by Hans Gundermann, contribute fundamentally to this debate.'
The authors have been dialoguing about these issues for many years.
Despite their divergent specialties, they share a passion for indigenous
affairs and the persuasion that theory can contribute to understanding, and
perhaps improve the fate of the autochthonous people of the Americas.
Gundermann's reflections begin with the Aymara and Tacameiia
population of the Chilean Andean North, travel through the "highlands of

1. Rolf Foerster & Jorge Ivan Vergara Etniay Naci6n en la Lucha por el Reconocimiento:
Los Mapuches en la Sociedad Chilena, MAPUCHES Y AYMARAs: EL DEBATE EN TORNO AL
RECONOCIMIENTO Y Los DERECHOS CIUDADANOS ( Rolf Foerster et al. eds. 2003) [hereinafter
MAPUCHES Y AYMARAS]; Hans Gundermann, Ethnicidad y Ciudadanfa en la Historia Andina
Reciente (1930-1990), in MAPUCHES Y AYMARA, supra.
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Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and the Northwest of Argentina and Chile,"2 and
ultimately touch upon the entire Latin American continent. Gundermann
explains how the notion of citizenship initially penetrated into these
territories by seeking to suppress difference. The state accordingly overlaid
formal equality upon colonial stratification. Consequently, it sought not to
subjugate, but rather to assimilate these communities. It exterminated
cultures, perpetuated substantive inequality, and maintained the
socioeconomic imbalance of colonial times.
Coincidentally, the original commitment to equality proved to be
incomplete and hypocritical. The indigenous people received fewer state
benefits than other social sectors and did not fully enjoy their political
rights. The electoral system excluded the illiterate and the dispossessed.
As the twentieth century unfolded, particularly the last three decades, these
deficiencies abated considerably, and the economic and political situation
of these groups improved significantly.
Gundermann calls for a fundamental change in the conception of
citizenship in order to incorporate the right to difference. Citizens should
be entitled not only to complete and equal inclusion in the system of legal
freedoms and guarantees, but also to special prerogatives to maintain their
idiosyncrasies and particularities. Specifically, Gundermann postulates a
dynamic and procedural notion of citizenship.
Citizenship cannot be defined ahistorically or independently of the
social and political contingencies of the nation and its social groups.
Citizenship must be understood as a process. It is not a goal, or
merely realized citizenship. In the historical circumstances of the
referenced Andean populations, citizenship remains something
essentially unfinished.3
Consequently, the postulated transformation must take place not through
a "leap of faith," but rather through protracted political engagement, and
should assume different forms in various contexts.
This civic notion has run into "enormous difficulties,"4 in Chile, as well
as in the rest of the Iberian America, due to the entrenchment of the
formalistic model. Nonetheless, indigenous people have passively and
actively insisted on full recognition, sometimes as separate national
communities, sometimes as ethnic minorities. Education and political
organization have contributed to the development of an intelligentsia and
2. Foerster & Vergara, Etnia y Nacitn en la Lucha por el Reconocimiento: Los Mapuches
en la Sociedad Chilena, in MAPUCHES Y AYMARAS, supra note 1, at 2.

3. Id. at 45.
4. Id.at 48.

628

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 17

a leadership class capable of marshaling this campaign. Even though parts
of the primordial culture have disappeared forever, the new cultural
outlook that has emerged feeds off the legacy that still remains and the
current experience of these groups.
Foerster and Vergara, in turn, examine the situation of the Mapuches
in Chile. They set out to solve a paradox. "Notwithstanding the
achievements attained upon the enactment of the law on indigenous affairs
and the increased sensitivity to the Mapuche community and its demands,
there has not been a substantive transformation in the manner in which the
state, corporations, and the influential dominant elite, along with its
mouthpiece, the newspaper El Mercurio,relate to that group."5 This piece
underscores two facts, which partially explain the apparent contradiction.
First, governmental institutions that deal with indigenous matters have
become bureaucratized and have started acting as agents of the state
instead of as genuine representatives of their constituency. Second, the
Chilean establishment has pressured the state to embrace the notion of a
primitive and homogenous ethnic nation and to abandon the ideal of a
republican and plural community of citizens.
In order to understand the problem in depth, Foester and Vergera
painstakingly define the appropriate theoretical framework. They
specifically develop the concept of recognition on the basis of the
abundant debate underway in Europe and the United States, as well as in
Latin America. From this perspective, they tease three different demands
out of the Mapuche cause: the agrarian, the ethnic, and the ethno-national.
The first, refers to the means of agrarian production, such as credits and
improvements in infrastructure. The second, encompasses issues such as
"respect for the Mapuche identity, bilingual and intercultural education,
and affirmative action, etc."6 The last demand, includes the "struggle for
a political and territorial autonomy," as well as the installment of a
"people's nation."7
Foerster and Vergara argue that the state has recently dealt with the
first two claims, albeit with fallbacks and timidity in the face of the
oligarchy's opposition to any concessions, and ignored the third, which has
now intensified. This neglect explains the seemingly puzzling increase in
ethnic conflict despite the state's efforts on behalf of the Mapuches. The
authors try to withhold judgment as to the legitimacy of this demand with
the declaration: "as analysts of the problem, we do not want, in any way,
to set the goals of the Mapuche movement. This collectivity has defined
5. Id. at 2.
6. Id. at 3.
7. Foerster & Vergara, supra note 1, at 3.
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its own objectives and will continue to do so, as it sees fit."' Foerster and
Vergara insinuate, however, that this claim makes them uneasy when they
point out its symmetry with the ethno-nationalism of the dominant class,9
when they refuse to defend its national or international legitimacy, 0 and
when they ponder a "different possibility, i.e., rethinking the idea of
national membership without neglecting the legitimate demand that
diversity be respected."'"
Both essays coincide in recognizing recent progress in indigenous
policy, in pointing out that fundamental deficiencies still exist, and in
emphasizing that first people should participate autonomously in the
solution of the problem. Gundermann further underscores the need to
transcend formal citizenship and recognition. Foerster and Vergara insist
that a substantive notion of citizenship could satisfy rural and ethnic
claims, but not the ethno-national demand.
An autonomist or separatist movement of an ethno-nationalist nature
would give rise to serious legitimacy problems. As Jirgen Habermas
relentlessly points out, nationalism hinders reconciliation and coexistence
in multicultural societies, oppresses ethnic minorities and dissidents, and
therefore could not be justified discursively." John Rawls would assert
that a nationalist regime saddles a thick conception of the good and a
comprehensive doctrine that are alien to certain individuals and groups
and, consequently, violates the principle of the fairness and precludes an
overlapping consensus.13 Both theories echo the Kantian notion of respect
for human dignity, as well as the corresponding imperative to treat people
like an end in themselves and never exclusively as a means.
Nonetheless, the battle for political autonomy or secession could take
a radically different form. It could seek not to advance a totalitarian and
exclusive ethos, but rather to protect, collectively, a threatened national
culture. The premise would then be that individuals, even in a liberal or
pluralistic society, might be unable to carry out the protection work on
their own. They might face collective action problems, like a prisoners'
dilemma, or weakness of will.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 45.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 3.
Id. at44.
See generally JURGEN HABERMAS, DIE EINBEZIEHUNG DES
POLHISCHEN THEORIE (1996).
13. See generallyJOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
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Of course, a project of this nature runs the risk of degenerating into
nationalistic oppression. It is therefore indispensable to impose severe
restrictions. The community would have to demonstrate not only that the
culture faces a threat requiring a collective defense, but also that the
deployed measures are narrowly tailored to the existing danger and
reasonably preserve the autonomous cultural space of divergent and
dissident subgroups. Ideally, impartial institutions would be in place to
scrutinize objectively whether these conditions have been satisfied.
What I am describing is a progressive nationalism of sorts. In other
words, the ultimate aim would be to place the national culture in a position
of equality and not of hegemony vis-&-vis other cultures. Moreover, the
interpretation of the national culture would be inclusive, rather than
exclusionary. Finally, the cultural autonomy of individuals would carry
considerable weight. The elitist and reactionary nationalism that Foerster
and Vergara describe would be discarded absolutely, not only for not
sharing these features, but also for not being able to show that the Chilean
culture faces any kind of peril inside Chile.
The proposal at stake embraces the Hegelian conviction that it is
possible to organize a political community around an integral ethical life
and respect individual rights. Thus conceived, society maintains the unity
and harmony of the Greek polis, as well as the individualism and the
subjectivity that characterize modernity. Social integration ceases to be
intuitive in order to become reflexive.
The projection of this or any other model onto indigenous reality
requires extreme caution since there are numerous nuances, differences,
and variations. Each community must accordingly build its paradigm on
the basis of its own experience. Similarly, each should be ready to make
revisions as underlying circumstances evolve.
In particular, the autonomy or independence at issue presupposes a
certain degree of territorial and cultural cohesion. In the case of the
Mapuches, the postulated arrangement may be appropriate for a
community that lives relatively separate and on its own, but not for a
subgroup that exists inside, or on the periphery of, Chilean urban centers.
Consequently, the first case may call for a progressive nationalist outcome
that allows the creation of an independent political structure, while the
second may require an ethnic solution that facilitates full recognition as a
minority. At any rate, it is fundamental not to isolate the two groups from
each other. On the contrary, free movement between them should be
allowed in order to avoid dividing families, so that the common culture
can be enriched from both sides. The expatriated members should have a
right to return to their community of origin.
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The complexity of the Mapuche example, resembles that of other
communities that are torn between homeland and Diaspora. Puerto Ricans,
Quebecois, and Corsicans face similar dialectics. It is useful to compare
and to contrast these realities in the search of an individual solution for
each case.
Thus far, I have ambiguously and indistinctly referred to autonomy and
secession. Of course, the two alternatives diverge, nationally and
internationally, in their possibilities and consequences. The difference,
however, pertains more to form than content. What is finally at stake in
both situations is the creation of a separate community structured around
a different political culture, which rejects neutrality and authorizes the
state to identify with a particular national perspective. Once the enormous
controversy that ineluctably precedes the decision to take this path is
overcome, determining whether the entity that emerges from this process
should be a sovereign country or an autonomous region becomes less
problematic.
If the first peoples instead opt to stay fully inside the national territory,
one could try to reach the previously mentioned synthesis between equality
and difference. These communities would enjoy basic civic freedoms, as
well as the right to self-determination. Moreover, these communities could
be integrated in the society that they inhabit without having to sacrifice
their identity. They would be under ideal conditions to contribute
splendidly to the pluralistic republic.
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